cross-posted from: https://infosec.pub/post/46084418

The PEADS Scenario in Response to a Republican Defeat in 2026

But beyond President Trump’s existing attacks on voting lies an additional and potentially more dangerous layer of presidential power—the secret emergency authorities embodied in Presidential Emergency Action Documents, or PEADs.

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The scenario would likely begin by Trump declaring that the election results were rigged, as he has in the past. He could identify specific jurisdictions—counties, cities, or states—and assert that their results should not be recognized. He could point to claims of fraud and irregularities, illegal ballots, or foreign interference, including cyber activity, as the basis for that claim.

In response, compliant federal authorities would require investigation of those results before they were finalized. The authorities would move to secure ballots, voting records, or related materials in contested jurisdictions, building on the actions the Trump administration has already taken.

While these investigations are taking place, the President could then call on congressional leadership to proceed as if the announced results are invalid, urging the Speaker of the House to organize the chamber on the basis of a Republican majority, and encouraging similar action in the Senate, urging them to ignore any jurisdictions in which the federal government was still undertaking its review.

While any such action would be immediately litigated at that point, the President’s actions would be very likely to provoke a response from the voters themselves. People would take to the streets. They would protest what they understand to be the nullification of a legitimate election. Demonstrations would spread across major cities. Organized groups would coordinate marches, strikes, and shutdowns. Labor organizations, civic groups, and political networks would mobilize. The scale would quickly become national.

The President would likely respond with the kind of language he has already used to describe his political opponents, such as the “enemy within,” domestic adversaries he has previously said should be targeted by the U.S. military. This assertion would be consistent with his existing direction to his administration to treat “organized political violence” and “domestic terrorism” as priority threats and to identify, investigate, prosecute, and disrupt “to the maximum extent permitted by law” not only individuals, but organizers, funders, and supporting networks.

He could apply that framework to the protests. He could direct the Attorney General to treat coordinated demonstrations as organized political violence. He could instruct the FBI and Joint Terrorism Task Forces to identify organizers, map funding sources, and examine any connections—real or alleged—to foreign actors. He could direct the Internal Revenue Service to examine nonprofit organizations supporting protests and refer cases for enforcement.

Federal agents would then make arrests. They would arrest individuals at protests, whether or not violence has occurred. They would arrest organizers identified through communications and financial records. Prosecutors would bring conspiracy charges and seek pretrial detention, including on theories of coordinated activity rather than specific acts of violence. The threshold for those actions would be defined by how the government characterizes the activity, not by the presence of violence in any conventional sense.

These actions would be taken under existing federal criminal, national security, and emergency authorities. But these actions would be unlikely to resolve that kind of election crisis.

If protests expand and continue, if major cities see sustained disruption and strikes take hold, the President could declare that the situation threatens the functioning of government and constitutes a national emergency. This escalation would bring us to his use of the PEADs.

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Immigration enforcement already provides precedent. Investigative reporting has identified more than 170 cases during 2025 in which U.S. citizens were unlawfully detained by federal immigration agents, who have no authority over them, sometimes for days and without prompt access to counsel. Those cases show how quickly detention can occur and how slowly legal status may be resolved once it does.

The Department of Justice would align prosecutions with those directives. The FBI would identify and apprehend individuals classified as organizers, coordinators, or participants in what the administration defines as organized unlawful efforts to interfere with legitimate government processes. That would be the same framework used in January 6 prosecutions, where hundreds of defendants were charged with obstructing the certification of the electoral count.

At the same time, the President could direct control over communications. That authority would extend to internet service providers, social media platforms, and communications infrastructure. The administration could order providers to restrict services, remove content, or provide user data. It could compel cooperation or threaten penalties for noncompliance. Even partial restrictions, such as slowing networks, limiting platforms, or targeting specific accounts, could disrupt the ability of protest networks to communicate and organize in real time.

The President could also direct the seizure or control of property. These would include seizing facilities used for organizing and taking control of vehicles, equipment, and communications systems.

The same authorities could extend to the financial system. Federal agencies could direct banks and payment networks to freeze accounts associated with organizations or individuals under investigation, restrict access to payment rails, and limit the ability of targeted groups to fund operations or sustain protest activity.

The pressure would extend beyond banks and payment systems. Large employers, logistics firms, and critical infrastructure operators could face directives tied to compliance with federal orders. Companies that rely on federal contracts, licenses, or regulatory approvals would have strong incentives to align with those directives, whether by restricting operations, limiting employee participation in protests, or cooperating with enforcement actions. These pressures would not require universal agreement. Partial compliance by major actors would be sufficient to disrupt organizing capacity and reinforce the effect of federal measures.

These actions could be taken broadly at the outset, before courts rule on their legality, preceding any form of judicial review.

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A foreign trigger would accelerate this sequence.

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That framing collapses the distinction between external threat and internal dissent.

The sequence does not depend on the accuracy of his claims. It depends on his authority to act and his willingness to use it.

Countering the Threat

Governors can decide now that they will certify results under state law and will not alter or withhold certification in response to federal claims. They can secure custody of ballots and direct state law enforcement to protect election materials. They can prepare for the possibility that federal agents will attempt to seize ballots or voting infrastructure and define in advance how state authorities will respond.

They can also prepare to use their own emergency authorities. Governors control the National Guard in their states unless federalized, and can deploy it to maintain public order, protect election infrastructure, and ensure that state and local officials can carry out their duties. Those duties can include keeping polling places, counting centers, and state facilities open and accessible in the face of disruption. They can coordinate that posture in advance with local law enforcement and, where appropriate, with neighboring states.

Governors also can communicate clearly and early to their constituents that election results will be honored, that certification will proceed under state law, and that the rights of voters will be protected regardless of federal claims to the contrary. That kind of clarity can shape public expectations before a crisis, not after it.

Secretaries of state can harden chain-of-custody procedures, secure physical and digital records, and prepare detailed audit documentation for immediate release. They can pre-position public reporting systems that make results, audits, and underlying data rapidly accessible. Speed matters. Claims of fraud and irregularities take hold quickly; rebuttal must be expeditious.

State attorneys general can draft complaints now, identify jurisdictions for filing, and coordinate multi-state litigation strategies. They can prepare to challenge ballot seizures, interference with certification, emergency detentions, and federal control of election processes. They can also coordinate with local prosecutors and law enforcement to define how state criminal law applies to interference with election administration. Litigation will come in any case. Preparation determines when it begins.

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Community-Based Planning

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The mechanism is straightforward: visibility changes behavior. That model can scale.

Legal organizations can prepare coordinated litigation strategies in advance. Media organizations can establish systems to verify, timestamp, and publish documentation in real time. Civil society networks can build distributed observation systems across jurisdictions, ensuring that federal actions are recorded as they occur rather than reconstructed later.

Technology and communications firms can prepare to challenge federal directives and decide in advance whether they will disclose those directives publicly before complying. Public disclosure can shape the environment in which those directives operate.

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Preparation is practical. Officials can establish succession plans. Authority can be distributed across offices and jurisdictions. Civil society organizations can decentralize leadership and build systems that continue to function if key individuals are removed. Legal defense structures can be established in advance.

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Emergency planning of the kind described in this article is not prediction. It is deciding, in advance, how this nation will respond when it is tested.